社会规则理论与作为制度事实的法律  

Theory on Social Rules and Law as Institutional Facts

作　　者：马驰[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学法学院

出　　处：《北方法学》2013年第5期43-56,共14页Northern Legal Science

基　　金：天津市哲学社科规划项目"社会冲突中的律师角色"(项目编号TJFX12-015)的研究成果

摘　　要：哈特的社会规则理论直接应对的是如何解释法律约束或法律义务的来源问题。他虽然在聚合行为和批判反思态度的基础上界定法律的约束力,但《法律的概念》实际上并没有阐明其中的内在机理。哈特的理论与约翰·塞尔有关制度事实理论之间存在密切的关联。在塞尔的理论中,制度事实因集体意向性、功能归属和构成性规则而产生,无论其原始材料为何。作为一种特殊的存在,制度事实及其逻辑结构本身就已经证明相关权力的存在。借助这一思路,法律也可以被视为制度事实,这种制度事实的原始材料是各种言行行为,而哈特的承认规则相当于构成性规则。如此一来,套用塞尔的理论,社会规则理论对法律的约束力解释力便可获得深化和加强。Hart＇ s theory on social rules explains the source of legal force and legal obligation. Though he has defined the legal force based on convergent behavior and critical reflective attitude, the Concept of Law failed to explicate the internal reasons therein. Hart＇ s theory closely relates to the theory of institutional facts proposed by John R. Searle, in which institutional facts originate from collective intentionality, assignment of function and constitutive rules, regardless of brutal facts. As distinct existence, institutional facts and their logic structure have already proved the existence of power. Therefore, law can be deemed as institutional facts whose brutal facts are various speech acts. Hart＇ s rules of recognition equals to constitutive rules. Resorting to Searle＇ s theory, the effects of social rules theory to interpret the legal force can be intensified and enhanced.

关 键 词：社会规则理论 制度事实 法律约束力 

分 类 号：DF0[政治法律—法学理论]