竞争闭环供应链纵向控制结构演化分析  

Evolutionary Analysis on Vertical Control Structures for Competing Closed-loop Supply Chains

作　　者：宋敏[1] 谢大叶 黄敏[1] 王兴伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学信息科学与工程学院流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室(东北大学),辽宁沈阳110819 [2]沈阳飞机工业(集团)有限公司,辽宁沈阳110850

出　　处：《信息与控制》2013年第4期484-491,共8页Information and Control

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071028,70931001,71021061,61070162);国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(61225012);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金优先发展领域资助项目(20120042130003);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20110042110024,20100042110025);工信部物联网发展专项资金资助项目;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N110204003,N120104001)

摘　　要：针对决策者理性有限的竞争闭环供应链(CLSC),应用演化博弈理论研究其纵向控制结构演化问题.首先,给出不同渠道结构下的竞争闭环供应链的最优策略.其次,利用复制动态方程分析了闭环供应链纵向控制结构的演化过程.最后,从"多赢"角度出发,给宏观政策的制定提供了有价值的参考.研究表明:闭环供应链纵向控制结构的演化稳定策略(ESS),受链链之间的竞争强度、废旧品回收的难易程度以及再制造成本节约的共同影响.因此,政府可以通过控制链链之间竞争强度、加大环保宣传和对再制造行为进行补贴的方法促进闭环供应链纵向控制结构向中心化结构演化,最终实现"多赢".The evolution of vertical control structures for competing closed-loop supply chains （CLSCs）, in which deci- sion makers are with bounded rationality, are investigated based on evolutionary game theory. Firstly, optimal strategies for competing CLSCs under different channel structures are deduced. Then, the evolution process of vertical control structures for CLSCs is analyzed by the replicated dynamic equation. Finally, insightful references for the macro-policy making are provided for the sake of a multi-win situation. Result shows that the Evolutionary Stable Strategy （ESS） is determined by the competing intensity between CLSCs, the hardness of collection and the saved cost by remanufacturing. Therefore, the government can promote the evolution of vertical control structures of CLSCs to the centralized structure by controlling com- peting intensity, strengthening propaganda of environmental protection and making subsidies for remanufacturing activities, and ultimately achieves the multi-win situation.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 供应链竞争 纵向控制结构 演化博弈 

分 类 号：TP182[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]