建筑企业低价投标的原理与治理  

Principles and Regulations of Low-Price Bidding for Building Enterprises

作　　者：蒋其发[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072 [2]云南财经大学国际工商学院,云南昆明650221

出　　处：《华北电力大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期25-30,共6页Journal of North China Electric Power University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：云南省教育厅重点课题"民间资本参与大中型水利工程项目建设机制研究"(项目编号:2012Z144C)

摘　　要：采用成本效益法分析建筑企业低价投标的经济原理,发现低价投标行为多为企业短期利益最大化或者长期战略决策的理性行为;而采用社会福利法探讨企业低价投标行为对社会整体福利和行业发展的影响则是不确定的,需要结合具体情况予以分析。因此,政府是否需要干预低价投标行为必须推理认定。政府应通过加快工程招投标机制和建筑业市场化改革进程,并采取试点而后逐步推广的办法从宏观层面治理企业低价投标行为。By means of Benefit-Cost Analysis （BCA）, it is rational for the Low-Price Bidding to maximize the enterprise＇ s tactic or strategic profits. When using Welfare Analysis, whether the Low-Price Bidding exerts negative or positive influences on the general welfare and industrial development should be appraised in the light of concrete conditions. Therefore, whether the government should regulate the Low-Price Bidding or not must be evaluated under the ＂rule of reason＂ standard. The regulations include increase the reformation of construction, and first make experiments at chosen units and then extend its application step by step. The regulations must include increasing the reformation of project bidding mechanism and construction market, etc. and firstly governments should make experiments at chosen units and then extend its application step by step.

关 键 词：建筑企业 工程招标 低价投标 治理 

分 类 号：F416.9[经济管理—产业经济]