基于演化博弈分析的银行业监管研究  

Research on Banking Regulation Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis

作　　者：梁艳[1] 原毅军[1] 杨乾坤[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《预测》2013年第5期34-38,共5页Forecasting

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(12YJA790078);大连理工大学人文社会科学基金重点资助项目(DUT11RW303)

摘　　要：2007年次贷危机和2011年欧债危机,都更加突显银行业监管的重要性和改革的必要性。本文通过构建银行和监管机构的演化博弈模型,分析二者动态博弈与相互学习作用,推导出在资本监管约束下,银行业采取低风险策略的理想区域和向理想区域转化的有效途径,得到资本监管约束有效降低银行风险承担行为激励的条件是存在破产风险、加大监管惩罚力度和市场约束作用,有效地论证资本监管约束对银行风险承担行为影响的动态作用机理,并提出银行业监管改革的政策建议。People fully are aware of the importance and the need for reform of the banking supervision through the Sub- prime Crisis in 2007 and the Debt Crisis in 2011. The paper analyzes the process of dynamic game and learning from each other between banks and regulators by building evolutionary game model, and then derives an ideal area for banks to take a low-risk strategy and an efficient way to change to the ideal area under the capital regulation constraints. Mean- while we get the conditions which capital regulation constraints can effectively lower the banks risk-taking behaviors are existence of bankrupt risk, enhancing regulation penalty and market discipline effect, and then reasonably prove the dynamic mechanism that capital regulation constraints can inhibit bank risk-taking behavior. At last the paper puts forward the regulatory reform policy recommendations.

关 键 词：资本监管约束 演化博弈 银行风险承担行为 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]