定向增发是否能缓解大小股东之间的代理冲突——基于恶性增资视角的研究  

The Impact of Directional Private Placemen on Agency Problem:From the Escalating of Commitment Perspective

作　　者：唐洋[1] 白钰[1] 李雨潇[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学商学院,天津300134 [2]香港科技大学理学院

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2013年第5期69-74,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJA630142);教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJA630150);国家自然科学基金项目(71072099)

摘　　要：基于恶性增资视角,以2001～2010年采用SEO方式融资的上市公司为样本,研究定向增发对缓解大小股东代理冲突的作用。结果发现,定向增发在一定程度上缓解了代理冲突,抑制了恶性增资发生的概率。进一步,将样本扩大到包括非SEO融资的公司,发现公开增发或配股的公司恶性增资发生概率较高,定向增发和债权融资无显著差异。对于发生恶性增资的公司,SEO融资的公司的恶性增资程度均显著高于债权融资公司,这进一步说明相比于公开增发和配股,定向增发能起到一定的治理作用。Based on the study of Escalating of Commitment, the influence of directional pri- vate plaeemen to alleviating the agency conflicts is examined with the data of Chinese A-share lis- ted firms using SEO through 2001-2010 in this paper. It finds that directional private placement can significantly reduce the probability of escalating of commitment, but the degree of Escalating of commitment does not decrease significantly. Furthermore, expanding the sample to companies that use debt financing, it finds that the probability of Escalating of commitment is higher in the companies using public issuance or rights offering, but there is no significant difference between the directional private placement and debt financing. Compared with debt financing, companies u- sing SEO will aggravate the degree of escalating of commitment.

关 键 词：定向增发 恶性增资 公开增发与配股 代理问题 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]