固定费用结构下基金经理管理费激励研究  

Research on Management Fee Incentive to Fund Manager under Fixed Fee

作　　者：曹兴[1,2] 秦耀华[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲412003 [2]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2013年第5期107-111,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金项目(08BJY152);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-07-0857);湖南省哲学社会科学基金重大委托项目(12WTA45);湖南省哲学社会科学基金重点项目(11ZDB060)

摘　　要：基于经理的努力水平和风险规避程度是基金经理费设计的关键因素,构建固定费率结构下基金经理努力及风险选择的模型,结合我国基金样本数据进行了实证研究结果表明:管理费与基金业绩无显著正相关性,且低业绩的基金体现出较高的管理费率;管理费与基金风险具有显著的正相关关系。The design of management fee to fund managers mainly depends on their hard work and their ability to avoid risks. In the paper, a model of management fee has been established. Tested by the fund samples in China, it shows that management fee had little incentive on fund performance, and poor performance fund is related to a high management fee ratio, and manage- ment fee has a positive relationship with fund risk.

关 键 词：管理费 激励基金业绩 基金风险 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]