有限理性下竞争性联盟成员合作创新博弈分析  

Analysis of Decision-making Game of Cooperative Innovation in Competitive Alliance within the Framework of Bounded Rationality

作　　者：龙跃[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学商务策划学院 [2]电子商务及供应链系统重庆市重点实验室,重庆400067

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第9期84-89,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ120730);重庆市高等学校青年骨干教师资助计划(渝教人〔2011〕65号);电子商务及供应链系统重庆市重点实验室专项基金项目(2012ECSC0201)

摘　　要：将合作创新中的决策方式分为坚持合作与中途违约,对比分析了两种创新方式下的利润,从演化博弈的角度分析了合作不溢出和合作溢出下的企业决策演化过程,并通过仿真算例进行了验证。结果表明:有限理性下的竞争性联盟成员创新决策演化过程中,合作创新主体吸收能力越强,越有利于整体利益的增加;适当调整合作违约金和利益分配比例,有利于控制合作创新中的机会主义行为,提高资源社会化配置效益。Decision-making in cooperative innovation was divided into two modes of collaboration and default in this paper. The profit under these two modes was calculated out and compared. The decision-making evolution process under these two modes was discussed from the perspective of evolutionary game. And a simulation example has been verified. The result shows that in the decision-making evolution process in competitive alliance within the framework of bounded rationality, the stronger the absorptive capacity of cooperative enterprises is the more increase overall interests promote. The opportunistic behavior in collaborative technological innovation can be controlled by adjusting the ratio of interest distribution and the a- mount of penalty, which would promote the collaborative decision-making and improve resource social allocation efficiency.

关 键 词：有限理性 竞争性联盟 合作创新 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F273.7