税收不遵从中的激励与合谋防范分析——基于博弈论的视角  

Analysis on Incentive and Anti-collusion in Tax Non-compliance——Based on Game Theory

作　　者：李松森[1] 盛锐[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学财政税务学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《燕山大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第3期136-140,共5页Journal of Yanshan University:Philosophy and Social Science

摘　　要：为了防范稽查人员与纳税人之间的合谋,以节约政府的投入,拟建立一个考虑"政府——稽查人员——纳税人"三层等级结构的纳税主体,假定其信息获得与支付函数,以及博弈时序的博弈模型。通过对模型无合谋解的求解,得到了防合谋激励合约,并进一步运用比较静态分析方法,得出最优惩罚力度与税收不遵从概率、稽查人员发现税收不遵从的概率及其与反合谋成本的关系。提出了科学的税收负担率、适度的税务稽查频率和查处概率、适度的税收处罚率、良好的"诚信纳税"氛围等治理税收不遵从行为的思路。In order to prevent collusion between inspectors and taxpayers, to reduce government spending, this paper established a three-tier hierarchical structure of subject with ＂government - inspectors - taxpayers ＂. We obtained anti-collusion incentive contracts by solving the model without collusion solution, and then used the comparative static analysis method to work out the relationship between the optimal punishment probability of non-compliance with tax, the probability of non-compliance that tax inspectors find and the costs of anticollusion. In the end, we put forward some methods to solve non-compliance behavior, such as scientific tax burden rate, moderate frequency of tax audit and investigate, moderate tax penalty rate and a good ＂haonest tax payment＂ atmosphere.

关 键 词：税收不遵从 激励与合谋防范 比较静态分析 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]