基于成长后期的创业企业融资演化博弈分析  

An evolutionary game based on start-up financing after growth period

作　　者：王国红[1] 罗震[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《科技与管理》2013年第5期26-29,共4页Science-Technology and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71073014)

摘　　要：利用演化博弈方法研究了处于成熟期和扩张期的创业企业融资策略选择(指在股权融资和债权融资间选择)的演化过程,建立投融资双方模式选择的演化博弈模型,分析投融资双方在股权模式和债权模式两种策略下的选择行为,根据复制动态方程得到了双方投融资模式选择的演化规律,分析给出各种情况下的演化稳定策略,并提出了达到稳态投融资模式发展路径的相应建议。An evolution process is studied of business enterprise financing strategy selection （the selection between equity financing and debt financing） in mature period and the expansion, by the evolutionary game method. The evolutionary game model is established on both sides of investment and financing mode selection. And the selection behavior of both the equity investment and financing mode is analyzed under the two strategies of equity and debt. Then the evolution law of investment and financing mode selection is obtained according to the replicated dynamic equation, evolutionary stable strategy is analyzed of various cases, and the corresponding suggestions are put for- ward in the development path of steady-state investment and financing mode.

关 键 词：股权模式 债权模式 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 成长后期 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]