风险投资并购退出行为的演化博弈分析  

An evolutionary game analysis of M&A exit behaviorof venture capital

作　　者：张新立[1] 张璐[1] 王欣[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁大连116029

出　　处：《辽宁师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第3期323-328,共6页Journal of Liaoning Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(10YJC630395);大连市科技局项目(2013D13ZC186)

摘　　要：运用演化博弈理论,建立了基于谈判破裂风险条件下外部投资者与风险投资家之间并购退出行为的演化博弈模型,对影响双方并购退出定价的主要因素和采取的策略进行了演化博弈分析,结果表明:外部投资者采取策略的稳定性由风险投资家认为谈判破裂的可能性决定,而风险投资家的策略稳定性主要受外部投资者认为谈判破裂的可能性、双方的出价及风险企业的真实价值共同决定.This paper sets up a evolutionary game model of M＆A exit behavior between outside inves- tors and venture capitalists under risk of breakdown. It analyzes the main factors that affect M＆A negotiation and evolutionary strategies. The model shows that ESS of the outside investors mainly depends on the attitude of the venture capitalists towards the risk of negotiation breakdown, the ESS of the venture capitalists is closely related to the attitude of the outside investors towards the risk of negotiation breakdown, the two parties; bid and the real value of the enterprise.

关 键 词：风险投资 并购 退出 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]