合作研发中的双边道德风险和利益分配  

Bilateral moral hazard and profit sharing of cooperative R&D

作　　者：孟卫东[1] 代建生[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2013年第4期464-471,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(08AJY028)

摘　　要：针对合作研发中研发能力和谈判能力对利益分配和研发模式的影响,运用纳什谈判解,构建了存在双边道德风险的合作研发联合生产模型.研究表明:合作研发实现的净收益随参与方研发能力的增强而增大分析了合作双方研发能力和谈判能力对最优线性分配比例的影响,得到以下结论:一方所得分配比例随自身研发能力的增强而增大,随对方研发能力的增强而减小,但与双方的谈判能力无关.考察了研发模式的选择与研发能力的关系:只有当合作研发能实现正的合作净剩余时,企业才会采用合作研发的模式;当研发能力差距悬殊时,实力较弱一方应将研发业务外包给实力较强一方.This paper investigates how R＆D capacity and bargaining power affect the profit sharing and R＆D modes.By virtue of Nash bargaining solution,a joint production model is established for cooperative R＆D with double moral hazards.It shows that net income realized increases when the R＆D capacity of the participants improves.It analyzes how the R＆D capacity and bargaining power affect the optimal linear sharing ratio,it is concluded that share of a certain participant,independent of the bargaining powers of both two parties,becomes larger as its own R＆D capacity becomes stronger.It investigates relationships between R＆D modes and the R＆D capacity and points out that the cooperative R＆D mode would be taken only when there exists a positive net cooperative residual.When gap between R＆D capacities of both the two participants in cooperative R＆D is extraordinary large,one party with relatively weak R＆D capacity would outsource R＆D to the other party with the relatively strong R＆D capacity.

关 键 词：合作研发 双边道德风险 谈判力 研发能力 利益分配 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]