序贯机制下投票人策略出席行为实验研究  

Experimental Study on Strategic Voting Turnout Behavior under Sequential Mechanism

作　　者：宗计川[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学实验经济学实验室,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2013年第9期108-120,共13页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"大股东控制权合谋机制与利益分配渠道实证与实验研究"(批准号71102088);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"上市公司股东投票出席率实证与实验研究"(批准号09YJC790032)

摘　　要：本文通过一个连续异质偏好实验,在实验室中检验了投票时序对早晚投票人出席决策的影响。实验结果表明:并不能断言晚投票人比早投票人具有投票优势,早晚投票组的组间规模差异对早晚投票人的出席决策具有重要的影响,是影响早晚投票人出席的一个重要因素;投票人的投票优势不仅受投票时序的影响,还受到组间规模的影响。该实验研究结论丰富和发展了文献中关于投票时序对晚投票人信息优势和实验室支付优势影响的诸多表述。其直接应用是:在类似股东投票或董事会选举中,如果客观存在部分参与人对提案或候选人质量缺乏了解,应该存在序贯机制使其能够选择晚投票,这种机制实际上起到了强制早投票人披露信息的作用。对于那些对提案(或候选人)质量信息缺乏了解的人,晚投票有助于其收集相关信息并做出科学的决策,这一序贯投票制度安排事实上从投票信息获取方面降低了中小股东参与治理的成本。In this paper, a continuous and diverse preference sequential voting experiment was set up to examine the effect of voting timing on earlier and later voter＇s turnout in laboratory. The experimental results show that the differential of earlier and later voting group sizes has a strong impact upon the turnout of earlier and later voters. The voting advantages depend not only on timing, but also on the group size of earlier and later voters. Conclusion can not certainly infer that the later voter gain advantage due to the voting timing. One direct implication of this study lies that if there exist part of shareholders which are lack of information related to the candidate or proposal in shareholder voting or board election in listed company, a sequential mechanisms should be applied to enable them vote later. This voting timing actually takes the role of compelling the earlier voters（mostly big shareholders） to release information. Furthermore, for many small shareholders who are lack of information, later voting can help them to collect information and make decision. The sequential voting mechanisms actually reduce the participating cost in CG for small shareholders in aspect of information collection.

关 键 词：序贯机制 投票行为 实验室实验 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]