论银行理财产品销售中的告知与知晓  

On the Disclosure and Know in the Sale of Bank Financial Products

作　　者：李立新[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学法学院,上海200444

出　　处：《河北法学》2013年第10期141-149,共9页Hebei Law Science

基　　金：上海市市本级财政部门预算学科建设项目<金融改革创新背景下的金融法研究和人才培养>的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：在银行理财产品的销售中,银行和客户围绕理财产品一方推销、一方询问,通过充分的说明、了解、客户决策后购买就签订协议。看似平淡的签约过程,实际存在信息不对称的黑洞。由于客户的购买决策很大程度上依赖于银行告知的信息是否真实充分,客户期待银行本着诚信原则,把那些足以影响缔约决定的重要信息如实告知。但怎样才算如实充分的告知而使客户知晓,这类纠纷中的客户损失应由谁来承担,需要从法理上明确告知的性质和告知违反的责任,从实务上明确告知与知晓的判断标准,以便最大程度救济受害客户的利益。During the sale of bank financial products, the bank try to promote the products and the client decide to sign a purchase agreement after full explanations and know. However, the apparently simple agreement process indicates that information asymmetry. Because the client to make buying decisions relies heavily on the true information that is disclosed by bank and to decide whether the disclosed information is sufficient to sign the agreement. So the principle of good faith of bank is expected. But how to judge the sufficient disclosure and who to bear the loss in dispute, at the same time, the nature of disclosure and the liability for violation of disclosure obligation need be defined in nomology and judgment criteria for practice also need be declared in order to protect the greatest degree of interests of victims.

关 键 词：理财产品 告知义务 知晓判断 信息披露 诚实信用 

分 类 号：DF438.1[政治法律—经济法学]