BOT项目套牢问题的博弈分析  

The Research on the Hold-up Problem of BOT Project

作　　者：李文新[1] 史本山[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《经济管理》2013年第10期156-164,共9页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金资助项目"基于RAROC的商业银行贷款组合优化及市场化管理研究"(12YJA790110)

摘　　要：由于合同的不完全性和资产的专用性,BOT项目参与方受利益驱动可能采用机会主义行为套牢对方。本文研究了BOT项目中的套牢问题,给出了项目公司和政府套牢问题的博弈收益矩阵;并引入产品购买方,构建了产品购买方和项目公司在政府监督和不监督两种情况下的基于合同价格谈判的套牢问题的博弈收益矩阵。求解得到各方采取套牢行为的临界条件,给出了不同情况下参与方的最优策略。研究表明,政府通过适时的监督、适当的罚款额度和合适的利益激励机制避免被项目公司套牢;项目公司应增大其事前的产权比例和再谈判成本,防止产品购买方通过价格再谈判将其套牢。This paper researched the B0T project＇ s hold-up problem, firstly, analyzed the hold-up mechanism among project company,government and product buyer. Then, the profit＇ s game matrixes including project compa- ny with government and project buyer have been given ; According to the profit＇ s game matrixes, the effect on both sides＇ expected benefit leading by the probability of government＇ s supervision,project company＇ s hold-up behavior and product company＇ s hold-up behavior were analyzed; Furthermore, discussed the optimal strategy and decision behavior. Finally, the conclusion was tested through a numerical example. In the B0T project, project company invests in capital, management, technology and so on, the input has the specificity characteristics that is known as specific investment, once the construction of project is completed, pro- ject company will lose the advantage of products＇ price bargaining. Meanwhile, project company masters more pro- fessional technology. As the information asymmetry and asset specificity, it may adopt the opportunism behavior to hold up project company by reducing the price of project＇ s product. Project company foresee the ex-post hold-up problem will reduce ex-ante specific investment, this behavior will lead project company＇s reducing the level of ef- forts by cutting down project＇ s construction cost, the result is government to be held-up. In order to ensure the re- alization of project＇ s social benefit, government needs to supervise project company＇ s behavior. The analysis of profit＇ s game matrixes between project company and government indicated whether the project company held up government was related to government＇s supervision probability and cost, so government can avoid be held-up by appropriately increase the supervision cost. The critical probabihty and the optimal probability ob- tained by the function of project company＇ s expected benefits. When the probability of project company taking hold-up behavior is less than critica

关 键 词：BOT 套牢问题 再谈判 机会主义 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]