利率控制、银行信贷配给行为变异与上市公司的融资约束  

Interest Rate Regulation,Behavior Distortion of Banks'Credit Allocation and the Financial Restriction of China's Listed Companies

作　　者：战明华[1] 王晓君[1] 应诚炜[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2013年第3期1255-1276,共22页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家社科基金(批准号:12BJY099)的资助

摘　　要：以逆向选择理论为基础,在加入了利率控制与银行风险厌恶等新的约束条件后,本文首先提出了一个中国上市公司可能并不存在传统意义上的融资约束,但利率市场化进程却将强化这种融资约束的假说。然后,利用中国上市公司的样本数据,本文通过对投资—现金流关系的实证考察检验了假说。本文不仅从理论上对具有中国特色金融市场不完全性的经济后果提供了一个观察视角,还包含了利率市场化有助于防止股票市场变异为信贷资源错配放大器等政策含义。Based on the theory of adverse selection, after considering the new restric- tions, the hanks＇ risk-averse and interest rate is controll, we first give an assumption, which concludes that there is no traditional financial restriction for China＇s listed companies, and the interest rate marketization wili force the financial restriction of listed companies. Then, using the samples of China＇s listed companies, we test the relationship between investment and cash flow. In this paper, we not only give a new theory to observe the consequences of the finan- cial-market imperfections, but also point out the importance of interest rate marketization pol- icy.

关 键 词：利率控制 市场不完全 融资约束 

分 类 号：F832.0[经济管理—金融学] F832.4F832.51F224