股权制衡:合谋还是监督?——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据  

Equity restriction: collusion or supervision?——Empirical evidence based on the companies listed on the GEM board

作　　者：郭志勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国计量学院经济与管理学院

出　　处：《中国注册会计师》2013年第8期37-45,3,共9页The Chinese Certified Public Accountant

基　　金：杭州电子科技大学浙江省高校人文社科重点研究基地(项目编号:ZD02-201302);浙江省哲社重点研究基地"产业发展政策研究中心";浙江省人文社科基地"管理科学与工程"(项目编号:SIPM3220)资助

摘　　要：本文基于创业板上市公司自然人控股或家族控股这一重要特征,研究了股权集中度、股权制衡对公司绩效的影响。实证结果发现:股权集中度与创业板上市公司经营绩效呈U型曲线关系。股权制衡的效果则取决于不同的股权关系,当公司由家族控股或存在一致行动人关系时,股权制衡无效果;而当大股东之间不存在上述关联关系时,股权制衡对公司绩效有显著的促进作用。这些研究结论表明,创业板其他大股东存在关联关系时会选择和控股股东一起合谋以共享控制权收益,只有在无关联关系时才能发挥监督作用。Based on the important feature of companies listed on the GEM board are controlled by individuals or family,this article takes a look into the impact of ownership concentration and equity restriction on company performance.The test shows that there is a U-shaped curve relationship between equity restriction and performance of companies listed on the GEM board.The influence of equity restriction depends on the ownership structure.When the company is controlled by a family or there is a persons in acting concert relationship,equity restriction has no influence;when the above mentioned relationships do not exist,equity restriction has a significant influence on company performance.The conclusion indicates that on the GEM board,if majority shareholders are correlated,they tend to collude with the controlling shareholders to share the benefits of control right,and they only play the supervision role when they are not correlated.

关 键 词：股权集中度 股权制衡 创业板 一致行动人 家族控股 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6