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出 处:《北京交通大学学报》2013年第5期41-47,共7页JOURNAL OF BEIJING JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(60903196;61272451)
摘 要:由于无线网络节点自身资源有限,末端节点往往会表现出自私行为以保证其生存时间和工作效率.针对这些特点提出了一种基于博弈的能量容忍策略(ETS)模型,该模型在经典针锋相对(TFT)策略的基础上,加入合作度及能量容忍因子,宽容节点一定程度的自私行为,并给予自私节点改过自新的机会,使其能够恢复合作.同时,基于ETS设计一种路由激励机制,通过奖惩激励自私节点放弃自私行为,并对能量相对较低的节点进行保护,在一定程度上避免个别繁忙节点过度消耗,均衡网络能量,延长了网络的运行时间.实验表明ETS激励机制在防止节点自私行为、优化网络吞吐率和网络生存时间方面等表现出较好的性能优势.Due to their limited resources, the end nodes often show selfish behavior for its lifetime and ef- fidenc3'. In this paper, we protxe a strategy based on the game called energy tolerance strategy (ETS) model. Main thinking of the rn^el are as folows. Bas~ on the classic tit for tat (TFT) stmt^y, we first add tolerance factor including energy and cooperation, which has a certain degree of tolerance for selfish node behavior and gives the opportunity of rehabilitation to selfish nodes so that they can quickly resume cooperation. Then, this paper pro~ a way to encoumqges load balancing. The mechanism encourages selfish nodes to give up selfish behavior, and recovers cooperative behavior rapidly after receiving system punishments and excessive consumption of busy nodes, It also keeps the balance of energy throughout the network, and extends the network' s running time. Experiments indicate that the mechanism shows a better performance advantage in preventing the selfish behavior of nodes and optimizing network through- put and network lifetime.
分 类 号:TP393.02[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]
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