地方政府控股下的地方银行制度变迁逻辑与风险防范  

The Logic of Institutional Changes and Risk Prevention of Local Banks under Local Government's Shareholding

作　　者：陶士贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学商学院

出　　处：《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》2013年第5期36-45,共10页Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJAGJW015);江苏省社会科学基金项目(09CSJ002)的阶段成果

摘　　要：地方政府投资参股银行机构,既是一种模糊产权形式,也是一种过渡产权形式。允许地方政府的资本进入银行业,本意是体现责、权、利相匹配的原则。然而,这可能导致地方银行机构成为地方政府的"提款机",信贷扩张增大,政府融资平台贷款持续增加,信贷集中度会更高,地区贫富差距会扩大,弱势群体的贷款难问题会加剧等。因此,作为过渡性产权形式,地方政府股权的退出将是一种必然结果,虽然短期内难以实现,但是这是解决这一问题的必然出路,因而必须壮大民营银行产权并使之成为第一行动集团。只有这样,地方政府才可能逐步退出银行的产权控制领域并让民营银行成为间接融资渠道的主体,实现银行产权的更替,最终分散和化解金融风险。Local governments invest in shares of banking institutions, which does not only blur ownership, but also forms a type of transitional ownership. Local government＇s capital is allowed to be invested into the banking sector, which aims to reflect the matching principle of responsibility, power and right. This, however, may lead to local banking institutions＇ reduction to local governments＇ ＂cash machines＂. This will cause such consequences as： credit expands, government loans grow inappropriately, credit concentration increases, the regional gap between the rich and the poor widens, and vulnerable groups have more difficulties in obtaining loans. Only when the private banks are given fuller property rights and become the first action group, can property replacement be likely to occur, and then can the government gradually withdraw from the bank＇s equity control field, so that private banks will become the subject of indirect financing channels, ultimately dispersing and dissolving financial risks.

关 键 词：地方中小银行 制度变迁 政府控股 风险防范 

分 类 号：F832.2[经济管理—金融学]