信念辩护与信念论  

The Justification of Belief and Doxasticism

作　　者：黄原[1] 胡新和[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学人文学院,北京100049

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2013年第9期23-28,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：走克道尔的概念论试图避开所予的神话而保留经验对信念的辩护作用,从而结束在所予论和融贯论之间的无尽摆荡。但由于概念论否认经验包含断定态度,因而造成经验不足以辩护信念。对概念论的辩护观念的批评提示了一种信念论的理论取向,即认为经验是一种信念。信念论对于经验与信念之间的关系问题,在走克道尔概念论和戴维森融贯论之外找到了一条出路。McDowell＇s conceptualism attempts to avoid the Myth of the Given while conserving the justificatory role of experience for beliefs, and thus stop the interminable oscillation. However, denying that experience involves judgemental attitude, coneeptualism is insufficient in justifying beliefs. Criticisms on the conceptualist notion of justification suggest a theoretical favour of doxastieism, which claims that experience is itself a kind of belief. As far as the relation between experience and belief is concerned, doxastieism points a way out away from McDowell＇s eonceptualism and Davidson＇s Coherentism.

关 键 词：概念论 信念论 经验 信念 辩护 麦克道尔 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]