煤矿事故中寻租行为的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of Rent-seeking in Coal Mining Accidents

作　　者：张新立[1] 张晗[1] 王欣[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁大连116029

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2013年第17期143-148,共6页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJC630395)

摘　　要：煤矿开采是我国最危险的主要行业之一,煤矿事故时有发生,尽管国家已采取了多项措施,但长期以来一直没有得到根本改善.针对我国煤矿事故频繁发生的现状和特点,从经济学的角度运用寻租和博弈论理论,通过建立博弈模型,对煤矿事故中涉及的主要三方博弈主体,即煤矿矿主、地方政府执法人员和中央政府监管部门之间的利益关系进行了研究,求出了模型的均衡解,分析了影响均衡解的相关因素,指出了影响煤矿事故频发的深层原因,提出了减少煤矿事故发生的相应对策建议.Coal mining is one of Chinese most dangerous career, coal mining accidences frequently take place. Although our country take lots of measures, coal mining accidences have not radically improvement over a long period of time. The paper discusses the situation and characteristics of frequent mining accidents on safety in China, from the economics point of view, the game models are set up by rent-seeking theory and game theory. Then, the paper analyzes the game between coal mine proprietor, local officers and central governments supervision department, solves equilibrium solution, analyzes related factors, points out some deep-seated reasons of the coal accidence. Finally, some countermeasures are put forward to avoid the coal mine accidences.

关 键 词：煤矿事故 寻租行为 博弈模型 

分 类 号：TD77[矿业工程—矿井通风与安全] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]