供应链协调中供应商的价格歧视策略  

ON SUPPLIER'S PRICE DISCRIMINATION STRATEGY IN SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION

作　　者：肖成勇[1] 王谦[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2013年第7期785-798,共14页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70731003)和国家自然科学基金(70601031)资助课题

摘　　要：分析了包含一个供应商和两个不同零售商的供应链网络的协调问题.将这一问题构建为一个两层次的博弈模型:零售商之间的非合作博弈以及供应商与零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈.博弈的均衡表明,通过简单的价格歧视,供应商就能够实现整个供应链网络的协调,而且价格歧视的水平与零售商之间的市场容量差异、产品需求的价格敏感系数以及产品的边际生产成本有关.在合理的参数范围内,市场容量更大的零售商所收取的零售价格较低,从供应商那里取货的成本也较低.这样的结论是比较符合现实情形的,这也就说明该模型为现实世界中的价格差异提供了另一种解释.此外,还分析了当供应商无法实施价格歧视时,由此导致的供应链的损失.We analyze the issue of coordination within the framework of one supplier and two heterogeneous competing retailers. In this paper, we construct a two-stage game theoretical model： retailers＇ nocooperative game and the Stackelberg game between supplier and retailers. The equilibriums show that the supplier can coordinate the supply chain through a simple price discrimination scheme, and the price difference is closely related with retailers＇ market capacity, consumer＇s price sensitivity between the retailers and the marginal production cost. With reasonable parameter values, we show that the retailer with bigger market capacity will set a lower price than the smaller retailer, and the supplier will charge her a lower wholesale price, which is in accordance the reality in retail industry. Therefore, our model provides an alternative explanation for the phenomenon. Besides, we also discuss the case whenthe supplier is prohibited from price discrimination, and the loss of potential revenue for the supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链协调 批发价协调 价格歧视 STACKELBERG博弈 非合作博弈 

分 类 号：F715.5[经济管理—产业经济] F224