家族控制权结构与银行信贷合约:寻租还是效率?  

The Composition of the Clannish Control Rights and the Credit Contract of Banks: Is it Rent-seeking or Efficiency?

作　　者：陈德球[1,2] 肖泽忠 董志勇[4] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心/国际商学院 [2]北京大学光华管理学院 [3]英国卡迪夫大学卡迪夫商学院 [4]北京大学经济学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2013年第9期130-143,188,共14页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102076;71272041;71272221);国家社会科学基金重点项目(11AZD010);教育部人文社科项目(10YJC630019);中国博士后科学基金(2012M520001);特别资助项目(2013T60006);对外经济贸易大学优秀青年学者培育计划资助;对外经济贸易大学学术创新团队等项目的资助

摘　　要：本文以2003～2010年沪深两市家族上市公司样本为研究对象,实证研究了家族控制权异质性特征与银行信贷合约之间的关系,以检验家族控制权寻租效应和效率效应的适应性情景。结果发现,家族通过金字塔结构和超额董事席位两种控制权增强机制对上市公司的控制程度越高,其获得银行信用借款的比例越低,担保借款比例越高。家族对企业的超额控制权传递着公司未来预期和信息风险,增加了银行面临的代理成本,体现了寻租观而非效率观。进一步研究发现,家族控制程度与银行信用借款之间的负相关性在具有政治关联、较高公司声誉和公司透明度高的企业中会降低。提高地区法律制度水平会降低家族超额控制引发的代理成本和信贷违约风险。地区银行业腐败会降低银行对借款企业超额控制所引发的信贷风险的评估能力。此外,家族对企业的超额控制影响企业信用借款的机制是通过提高企业债务违约风险来实现,家族对企业超额控制程度越高,企业债务违约概率越高。Taking as the object of study the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen Listed Companies between 2003 and 2010, we have made a case study on the relationship between the heterogeneous characteristic controlled by the clan and bank's debit in order to examine the effect of seeking renting of the clan control right and the state of the adaptability of the efficiency effect. By the results of our study, we have discovered that the greater the degree of the control, through the pyramid structure and the exceeding seats of directors –the two kinds of control right, of the family's strengthened mechanism, over listed companies, the smaller the proportion of the fiduciary loan obtained from the band, the greater the proportion of the guaranteed loan. The excess control right of the family over firms transfers com pany's anticipation of the future and the information risks, increases bank's agency cost, which embodies the concept of seeking rent and not the concept of efficiency. By further study, we have discovered that the negative relationship be tween the degree of the family control and bank's loan has political connection in firms with greater political connec tions, better reputations and higher levels of transparency. The rise of the level of the regional law system will reduce the agency cost and the risks, triggered by the excess control of the family, from the breaking a contract in credit. The corruption of the regional banks will lower bank's ability of evaluation of the credit risks aroused by the excess control over enterprises with debit. Moreover, the mechanism in which the family's impact on firm's excessive control affect ing firm's unsecured loan is realized by the increase in the risk of breaking a contract of debit; the greater the degree of family's control over firm's excessive amount, the greater the probability of firm's breaking a contract in debit.

关 键 词：家族控制 金字塔结构 超额董事席位银行借款 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F276.5F224