政府与民办养老机构互动机理及管理策略研究  

A Research on Interaction Mechanism and Management Strategy of Government and Private Pension Institutions

作　　者：柳键[1] 舒斯亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学信息管理学院,江西南昌330032

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2013年第10期151-156,共6页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71261006);江西省社会科学规划项目(11GL05)

摘　　要：文章通过建立民办养老机构与政府的博弈模型,探讨政府补贴与民办养老机构定价的关系,以及单层级服务与多层级服务选择问题,分析相关因素变化对政府与民办养老机构所带来的影响。结果表明,民办养老机构选择多层级模式时,应适当拉开服务水平层级差距;养老需求水平较高时,多层级模式优于单层级模式,养老需求水平较低时,单层级模式优于多层级模式;老年人的机构养老服务偏好越大,选择多层级模式对政府及民办养老机构越有利;高服务成本的养老机构宜选择单层级模式,低服务成本的养老机构宜选择多层级模式。The paper constructs a game model between government and private pension institutions, to explore the relationship between pricing of private pension institutions and government＇s subsidy, the selection of the single-class service mode or the muhi-class service model, then to analyze the influences of the related factors to government and private pension institutinns. The results show that： the priwte pension institutions should expand the gap of service level appropriately when the multi-class service mode is selected, the multi-class pension service mode is better than the single-class pension service mode when the pension demand level is higher, the single-class pension service mode is better than the multi-class pension service mode when the pension demand level is lower, the government and private pension institutions perform better with the muhi-class pension service mode when service preference of senior people increases, the pension service institutions with higher cost shouht choose single-class pension service mode, while the pension service institutions with lower cost should selec! muhi-class pension service mode.

关 键 词：民办养老机构 政府补贴 博弈分析 单层级服务 多层级服务 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]