技术标准制定中垄断行为的规制及对策研究  

Research on the Regulation of Monopolistic Behavior in Technical Standard Setting and Countermeasure Research

作　　者：罗蓉蓉[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学法学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《法学杂志》2013年第10期101-108,共8页Law Science Magazine

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金青年课题(项目编号:13YJC820060);湖南省博士生科研创新项目的资助

摘　　要：技术标准制定活动是竞争者之间的一项合作性行为,其与横向竞争者之间的共谋有本质的区别;标准制定活动本身具有的"选择竞争"性质及标准实施后的"锁定"效应可能增加专利权人的市场力,并诱发垄断。专利权人不当使用标准或操纵标准制定过程、不向标准制定组织披露专利信息或者虚假承诺等行为,都可能构成反垄断违法。除了反垄断法的必要规制,更需要建立"适当"的知识产权政策,以保证在专利权人获得创新回报与占用标准的排他性权利之间平衡。因此,专利权人的披露义务要适中,不宜过宽、过早,且仅限于披露必要专利;FRAND许可的判定,需对标准制定前后的不同环境下专利权人索取的许可费进行比较。Standards setting is a cooperative behavior between competitors, which has essen- tial differences with collusion between horizontal competitors. That the nature of ＇selection com- petition＇ of standard setting and the ＇ lock - in＇ effects after standard implement, may increase patentee＇ s market power and induce monopoly. That patentees misusing standards or manipula- tion of the standards setting process, and patentee non - disclosure patent information to standard setting organization, and false promises, and so on, could arise violation of the Antitrust Law, those typical cases in America could help us understand these monopolistic behaviors better. Be- sides essential regulation of Antitrust Law, proper intellectual property policy should be estab- lished to ensure the balance of patentee getting return of innovation and occupying the exclusive right of standard. Therefore, the disclosure obligation of patentee should be moderate, not too wide, too early, and limited to necessary patents. The judgment of FRAND should compare the license fee in different context which include before and after standard setting.

关 键 词：技术标准制定 垄断行为 反垄断规制 知识产权政策 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]