董事联结影响股价联动：关联分类还是资源价值？  

Does Directors' Network Make an Influence on Price Comovement?: Category-based Investment or Internal Resource Valoe

作　　者：陆贤伟[1] 王建琼[1] 董大勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]f西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2013年第10期47-54,共8页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目《有限理性下的自媒体证券信息传播:资源价值与负面效应》(项目编号:71271174)的资助

摘　　要：资产价格协同变化源于信息的关联性,企业所嵌入的社会关系和社会结构影响着企业间治理信息的扩散。以中国A股上市公司为研究对象,本文考察企业间董事联结关系对股价联动的影响。实证研究结果表明,董事联结影响股价联动,但这种联动性是由于董事联结的内在资源价值所形成的,而非投资者基于董事联结这一关系属性的简单分类投资形成的;进一步分析表明,节点股票的董事联结中心度与其它股票收益间的平均相关系数存在非线性关系,董事联结资源价值达到一定程度时,其对其它股票价格的主导作用逐步降低。Prices comovement derives from the relevance of information. Enterprises are embedded in social relationships and social structure, which influences the spread of information among corporates. Based on China＇s A-share listed companies, this paper studies the relationship between directors＇ network and price cornovement. Empirical results show that directors＇ network makes an influence on price comovement, but this correlation is due to its internal resource value rather than investors classified category-based investment. Further analysis shows that there is a nonlinear relationship between centrality and average correlation coefficient. The impact of directors＇ network on other stocks becomes weaker when the number of corporate connection reaches a certain degree.

关 键 词：董事联结 股价联动 关联分类 资源价值 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]