支付方式、关联并购与收购公司股东收益  

Payment Method,Related Party Acquisition and Acquirer's Shareholder Returns

作　　者：陈涛[1] 李善民[2] 周昌仕[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东海洋大学经济管理学院,广东湛江524088 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2013年第9期59-67,共9页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"投资者保护制度与控制权转移的效率研究"(70972074);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目"公司并购中政府行为规范研究"(GD10CGL03);广东海洋大学引进人才科研启动基金项目"并购支付方式的财富效应研究"(1012341)

摘　　要：文章从信息不对称理论出发,结合中国并购活动中的关联性特征,研究支付方式对收购公司股东收益的影响。选取我国上市公司收购非上市公司的569个事件为研究样本,采用事件研究法进行实证分析。实证结果表明股改后中国并购交易中收购公司股东获得正的超常收益;采用股票支付时收购公司股东收益显著为正,而现金支付对收购公司股东收益没有显著影响;关联并购比非关联并购能够为收购公司创造更大收益,关联并购中股票支付的股东财富提升更为显著,但是对于股权高度集中的收购公司就没有显著的正财富效应。This paper studies the relation between method of payment and return of acquirer, based on asymmetric information theory, considering M＆A with related party. Selecting 569 acquisition events of unlisted companies acquired by listed companies, we empirically study the acquirer return using event study method. The results show that the shareholders of acquirer earn a positive wealth effect in the acquisition for private target. The acquire returns are significantly positive with stock payment, while cash payment has no significant impact on acquirer returns. Related party acquisitions create greater returns than non-related acquisitions. And using stock payment in related party acquisition is generally associated with higher returns, while this effect is non-existent when the acquirer has a high ownership concentration.

关 键 词：支付方式 关联并购 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]