治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效  

Governance Environment,Ultimate Control of Shareholders and the Performance of Acquirers

作　　者：曾春华[1] 胡国柳[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2013年第9期68-77,共10页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(11XGL002);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0123)

摘　　要：文章以2007—2009年我国非金融上市公司扩张性并购事件为研究对象,对治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,终极股东的两权分离度及政府控制性质与公司并购绩效负相关;治理环境的改善在提高公司并购绩效的同时,还能抑制两权分离对公司并购绩效带来的负面影响;终极控制股东的政府控制属性会弱化治理环境的这种治理效应。On the basis of non-financial listed companies＇ expansion of M＆A events from 2007 to 2009, this paper investigates the relationship among governance environment, ultimate control of shareholders, and the performance of acquirers. The results show that both the separation of controlling rights from cash flow rights and the quality of governmental control over companies have negative influence on the performance of acquirers; improved corporate governance environment is conducive to curb the negative effect; but the role of corporate governance environment is weaker in ~overnment-ownad ct^rnnAnie~

关 键 词：治理环境 终极股东控制 两权分离 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]