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作 者:李武强[1] 刘树林[2] 孙荣庭[1] 李毅斌[1]
机构地区:[1]长安大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710064 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049
出 处:《中国管理科学》2013年第5期57-67,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(13BJY080);陕西省软科学研究计划项目(2012KRZ10)
摘 要:以报童模型为基础,研究了在由单一生厂商和零售商组成的供应链系统中,生产商如何通过契约设计来影响零售商的需求预测行为,使其收益最大化的问题。文章基于静态博弈模型对此问题进行了分析,发现在整合供应链情境下,当需求预测成本较小时选择预测能够获得更高的期望收益;在分散式供应链情境下,当生产商选择预测契约时,预测成本最终由生产商承担,且其期望收益为预测成本的减函数,而选择无预测契约时则为预测成本的非减函数;最后通过生产商期望收益对比,给出了最优策略。The supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a newsvendor retailer is the focus of this paper. In such system, the point is how to design contracts which aim at maximizing the manufactur-er's expected revenue by incenting the retailer's demand forecast decision. A static game model is devel-oped for the contract designing. It is found that the contract with demand forecast can lead to higher expec-ted revenue with low forecasting cost in the centralized supply chain. As in the decentralize supply chain, the manufacturer bears the cost entirely and its expected revenue is negatively related to forecasting cost when the contract with demand forecast is selected, but the manufacturer's expected revenue is nonde-creasing as forecasting cost increase when the contract without demand forecast is selected. Moreover, the optimal strategy about which contract can maximize the manufacturer's expected revenue is given.
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