发展中大国间贸易摩擦的微观形成机制——以印度对华反倾销为例  

The Micro Formation Mechanism of Trade Frictions between Developing Powers: With the Example of India's Anti-Dumping against China

作　　者：王孝松[1] 谢申祥[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院副教授,北京100872 [2]山东财经大学国际经贸学院副教授,济南250014

出　　处：《中国社会科学》2013年第9期86-107,206,共22页Social Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“国际贸易保护主义盛行背景下中国企业应对贸易壁垒的策略体系研究”(71203228)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：以Grossman和Helpman的"保护待售"模型为理论基础,使用1999—2009年案件层面的数据,定量分析印度对华反倾销税裁定的影响因素,揭示中印经济冲突的微观形成机制,可以发现:印度反倾销申诉者的政治势力会显著提高最终裁定的税率水平,进口渗透率同税率之间的关系则取决于申诉者在政治上是否有组织;反倾销税率同印度对华贸易逆差之间呈显著的正相关关系。这意味着,印度当局裁定反倾销税率时,明显受国内利益集团政治势力的影响,同时也有打压中国、谋求在龙象之争中获取优势的动机。Building on Grossman and Helpman's 'Protection for Sale'model,this study employs the case-level data in 1999-2009to analyze empirically the influencing factors in India's decision to impose anti-dumping duties on China,and to reveal the micro formation mechanism of economic conflicts between China and India.The results show that the political power of the Indian anti-dumping petitioner can significantly increase the duty level of the final decision,and that the relationship between import penetration ratio and duties is determined by the fact whether the petitioner belongs to a political organization or not;the anti-dumping duties have a positive correlation with India's trade deficit with China.These indicate that the Indian government's decision on anti-dumping duties is under the obvious influence of the political power of domestic interest groups and the motivation of suppressing China to gain an advantage in the competition between the two countries.

关 键 词：“龙象之争” 对华反倾销 “保护待售”模型 政治势力 

分 类 号：F752.02[经济管理—国际贸易] F753.51[经济管理—产业经济]