行政人员之间诚信博弈分析及制度安排  

On the Research of Trust Game Model among Administrative Staff and Its Institutional Arrangement

作　　者：李芬芬[1] 陈建斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学公共管理学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第5期72-75,共4页Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences

基　　金：湖南省研究生科研创新项目"社会主义棱心价值体系引领行政伦理建设研究"(编号:CX2012B234);湖南省高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地项目(编号:13K047)阶段性成果

摘　　要：在行政人员之间诚信博弈假设前提与博弈论理论前提相符的情况下,构建了无监督,有监督并实施奖惩,概率惩罚以及设置两个不同概率惩罚值的行政人员之间诚信博弈模型。通过对博弈模型进行分析,提出了行政人员之间诚信博弈的制度安排,从而为行政组织信任关系的研究提供新的视角。On the premise that there is consistency found in the Trust Game Assumption among administrative staff and assumptions for game theory, we establish a trust game model among administrative staff and set unsupervised condition, supervision with rewards and punishment condition, probability of punishment condition and probability of punishment condition with two measures in the model. Through the analysis of the model, we have worked out an institutional arrangement in trust game among administrative staff, which will contribute a new perspective to the studies on trust relations in administrative organizations.

关 键 词：行政人员 诚信 博弈 博弈模型 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]