考虑碳排放权交易的双寡头有限理性博弈分析  

Analysis of Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality and Carbon Emission Trading

作　　者：赵令锐[1] 张骥骧[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京211106

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2013年第3期12-19,共8页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71101071);国家重点基础研究发展计划(2012CB955802);江苏省教育厅哲学社会科学基金(2012SJD630086);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(NR2010039;NR2013006)

摘　　要：对有限理性Cournot模型进行改进,将其引入到碳排放权交易市场,建立一个考虑碳排放权交易的有限理性双寡头博弈模型。然后利用非线性动力学方法讨论该模型均衡点的存在性与稳定性,并进行数值仿真。研究发现碳排放权交易对系统有重要影响:碳排放权交易价格和二氧化碳产生系数不仅影响企业在均衡点的产量,还影响系统的稳定性。运用延迟反馈控制法对陷入混沌状态的系统进行控制,可以使系统重新回到Nash均衡状态。Improving the Cournot model with bounded rationality, and then applying it to the carbon emission trading market, a duopoly game with bounded rationality and carbon emission trading was established. By using the theory of nonlinear dynamic systems, the existence and stability of the equilibrium point of this model were discussed and some numerical simulations were made. The research results showed that carbon emission trading played an important role in the system. The price of allowances of carbon emission trading and the carbon emission coefficient not only affected the outputs of each firm in the equilibrium point, but also influenced the stability of system. Nash equilibrium of the model can be maintainable by using delayed feedback con- trol method when the model in chaos state.

关 键 词：碳排放权交易 有限理性 COURNOT模型 混沌 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] X51[环境科学与工程—环境工程]