基于质量摆动的供应链质量控制与协调研究  

Quality Control and Coordination in Supply Chain under Quality Oscillation

作　　者：晋盛武[1] 陈均誉[1] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学经济学院,合肥230601

出　　处：《商业研究》2013年第10期165-170,共6页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目;项目编号:71273082;教育部人文社科项目;项目编号:11YJA630039;安徽省软科学重大项目;项目编号:2011AKRK0980

摘　　要：本文在供应商产品质量摆动的情况下,研究产品有缺陷的二级供应链的质量控制与协调问题,通过建立质量分散合作模式和质量集中决策模式,得出两者在合适的契约条件下可以达到相同效果,并给出了质量契约参数与双方的策略选择和终端质量水平的互动机制。结果显示:供应商的质量惩罚越严厉,制造商承担的顾客损失比重越大,线性转移支付的比例越低,终端产品的质量水平就越好。In the condition of product quality oscillation, the paper studies the quality control and coordination of two - echelon supply chain in which the product is defective. By estahlishing the decentralized decision - making model and the centralized decision - making model of quality, this study finds that they can achieve the same effect with the appropriate contract. And then the article analyzes the interaction mechanism between the quality contract parameters with the strategy choice and the terminal quality level. The results show that the more severe punishment the supplier exerts, the more proportion the manufacturer undertakes, and the less linear transfer payment proportion, the higher terminal products quality level.

关 键 词：质量摆动 线性支付 质量保证 质量协调 终端质量水平 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]