基本药物安全监管博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Safety Supervision of Essential Drugs

作　　者：蒋苏苑[1] 汤少梁[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京中医药大学,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《辽宁中医药大学学报》2013年第11期95-98,共4页Journal of Liaoning University of Traditional Chinese Medicine

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJA630112)

摘　　要：基本药物的安全监管是政府监管机构与基本药物经营者之间的博弈过程。该文通过对此博弈进行均衡分析,揭示了基本药物安全不仅取决于监管者的监管成本和基本药物生产者的违法收益及处罚,还取决于政府部门是否有效地对监管者施行了监管,从而提出了完善基本药物安全监管的相应措施。The safety supervision of essential drugs is a game process between the government regulators and the operators of essential drugs.This essay analyzes the game equilibrium and shows that the safety of essential drugs not only depends on the supervision cost of regulators and illegal income and punishment of producers, but also relies on whether the government departments have enforced supervision effectively on the regulators.Then some appropriate measures to improve the safety supervision of essential drugs also have been proposed.

关 键 词：基本药物安全 监管博弈 奖惩力度 

分 类 号：R91[医药卫生—药学]