对赌协议的设计与再谈判  

The Design and Renegotiation on Valuation Adjustment Mechanism

作　　者：赵宇捷[1] 费一文[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海金融》2013年第10期41-46,117,共6页Shanghai Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70972066)

摘　　要：文章基于委托代理模型和贝叶斯概率方法,重点研究了较为盛行的"赌顺利上市"的股权对赌协议,详细分析了它的适用性和再谈判空间。研究发现:对赌协议有助于私募股权投资实现帕累托有效配置;且在我国较欧美成熟市场具有更强的适用性。文章进一步探讨了谈判双方签订对赌协议的初始策略以及中间业绩信号揭示后的再谈判策略。该分析框架很好地解释了我国私募股权投资中对赌协议盛行的现象,并为对赌协议中的再谈判提供了理论支撑。In this paper, the suitability and renegotiation space of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism(VAM) are discussed on the basis of principal-agent model and Bayesian method, with the focus on 'VAM contingent on IPO status'. We find that VAM is a tool to help PE investors to reach Pareto Efficiency, and VAM is more suitable to China's markets compared to western mature markets. We further provide some strategies on original contract formation and renegotiation after middle-stage performance signal are released. This framework can explain why VAM is so popular in China's PE markets and provide PE investors with theoretical support on the renegotiation of VAM.

关 键 词：私募股权投资 对赌协议 委托代理 帕累托有效 再谈判 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]