农民工工资拖欠问题的成因——基于博弈论和信息经济学视角  

Causes of Migrant Workers Salary Arrears Problem——Based on the Game Theory and Information Economics

作　　者：周强[1] 张全红[1] 

机构地区：[1]五邑大学经济管理学院,广东江门529020

出　　处：《德州学院学报》2013年第5期15-20,26,共7页Journal of Dezhou University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BJL040);广东省自然科学基金项目(S2012010009683)

摘　　要：面对农民工工资长期被拖欠的社会现象,通过不完全信息静态和动态博弈模型、委托-代理、以及独裁者模型,剖析各利益相关主体间的博弈行为,可以发现,在信息不对称情况下,中央政府的监管不到位和缺乏有效的激励措施,孕育了地方政府和企业之间的利益"合谋"行为,从而逐步消解了保障农民工权益的法律法规,导致法律体制在文本制定与正式实施过程中存在着巨大差距。因此,增强农民工法律意识的同时,确保中央和地方政府间信息的有效沟通,构建完善的奖惩机制,消除委托-代理困境是解决农民工欠薪问题的关键。This paper has studied the migrant workers salary arrears problem from the perspective of game theory and information economics. We construct the incomplete information static game model and dynam ic game model, the principal agent theory, as well as the dictator game model, and analysis the game behav ior between stakeholders. Research shows that because of central government＇s relaxed supervision,local government and enterprises are to build private partnership for profit sharing. Local government and enterprises＇ collusion weaken the laws and regulations step by step which ensure the rights of migrant workers. Last but not the least,effective measures are not only to enhance the legal awareness of migrant workers but also to ensure the interactive communication between the central and local government. In or der to eliminate the principalagent dilemma a comprehensive system of rewards and punishments is vital important.

关 键 词：农民工 欠薪 博弈 委托代理 政策法规 

分 类 号：F249.24[经济管理—劳动经济]