零售商双渠道闭环供应链博弈模型研究  

Study on Game Model for Retailer's Duo-channel Closed-loop Supply Chain

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作  者:孙亚贤[1] 谢铁军[1] 

机构地区:[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出  处:《物流技术》2013年第9期294-297,共4页Logistics Technology

摘  要:在零售商拥有双渠道销售模式下,研究由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的零售商双渠道闭环供应链模型.首先建立了集中决策下的博弈模型,然后在分散决策下建立了三种不同权力结构下的博弈模型.综合比较各模型的销售价格,回收价格和利润等得出一些结论。通过比较发现集中决策时的决策总是优于分散决策,最后利用改进的K-S解法,提出制造商和零售商可以根据各自对联盟的贡献来分配因合作增加的利润。In this paper, we studied a retailer's duo-channel closed-loop supply chain mode under which the retailer possessed two sales channels. First we established the game model for the scenario where the supply chain decisions were made in a centralized manner, and then established the game model for three different power structures for the distributed decision-making situation. Next, we compared the sales price,recycling price and profit of the models and reached some conclusions. At the end, using the improved K-S algorithm, we pointed that the manufacturer and the retailer could divide the additional profit due to the cooperation according to their contribution to their own leagues.

关 键 词:闭环供应链 双渠道 定价 博弈 K-S解法 

分 类 号:F246[经济管理—劳动经济] F253[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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