我国地方政府公司化倾向与债务风险:形成机制与化解策略  

The Corporatization and Its Debt Crisis of Local Governments in China: Why So and Way Out

作　　者：刘志彪[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏省社会科学院,南京210013

出　　处：《南京大学学报（哲学．人文科学．社会科学）》2013年第5期24-31,158,共8页Journal of Nanjing University(Philosophy,Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：2012年江苏省社会科学基金重大项目(12ZD001);上海市政府决策咨询研究重点课题(2013-A-24)

摘　　要：地方政府公司化倾向是我国地方政府间竞争制度安排的产物,也是我国泡沫经济产生的基础性因素。地方政府公司化引发的日趋严重的地方政府债务危机与地方政府竞争的制度安排之间只有事实上的联系,而没有逻辑的、必然的对应联系。未来应该维持中国这个特有的竞争制度优势,同时也要通过中央地方就财权和事权的改革以及财政金融体制的改革,继续为中国经济增长创造强大的动力。在中国地方政府目前特殊的举债融资机制下,即使偿债率、债务负担率等指标不高,也可能因泡沫经济破裂而直接导致经济危机。为了守住不发生金融危机的底线,最重要的事情是要管理好地方政府的投融资平台,尽早斩断可能引起泡沫破裂与经济危机之间的联系纽带,事先排除隐藏在地方政府投融资平台中的各种"隐形地雷"。To strengthen their competitive muscles,the local governments now get themselves corporatized,thus providing,unfortunately,more bubbles to China's economy. This tendency results not only in more serious debt crises for them,but also in redundancy and irrelevance in institutional establishments. This paper argues that China should keep this unique competitive system,together with the reform concerning the fiscal power and administrative authority of the governments of all levels,so as to create powerful impetus for China's economic growth. With the present unique financing mechanisms however,the local governments may well bubble the economy into crisis,even if they may keep high both debt service ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio.To guard the bottom line against any financial crisis,the most important to do is to well manage local-government investment and financing channels,cutting off any undermining possibility leading to the crisis of a bubbling economy.

关 键 词：政府竞争 地方政府公司化 政府债务危机 举债融资机制改革 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]