新农合的福利效果与改革方向——基于供给者诱导需求的分析框架  

Study on New Rural Cooperative Medical System's Welfare effects in China and Reform Direction——An analytic framework based on supplier induced demand

作　　者：宁满秀[1] 杨志武[2] 刘进[1] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学公共管理学院,福建福州350108 [2]东北农业大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150030

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第5期32-36,共5页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划青年基金(11YJC790138);中国博士后科学基金特别资助(201003329);福建省杰出青年科研人才培育计划阶段成果(JA11029S)

摘　　要：现阶段新农合政策对医疗费用的控制主要着眼于共付机制的需求方约束,这必然以降低农户福利水平为代价。在医疗服务供给者诱导需求的条件下,供给方的道德风险引致的过度诊疗必然带来医疗费用急剧膨胀,最终造成医疗资源配置严重浪费和低效率。基于以供给者诱导需求为分析框架,从理论上对我国现阶段新农合政策的福利效果进行了阐述,认为影响新农合政策中医疗服务供给者行为的主要因素有:市场竞争形态、信息不对称以及医疗保险支付方式。并据此认为,新农合的改革方向应以控制医疗供给方的道德风险为核心,真正提高农户从新农合制度中享受到的福利和收益。In the present stage, the new rural cooperative medical care system （NCMS） tries to control medical expenses by focusing on co-payment mechanism which imposes restrictions on health care utilization of the demander and hence reduces the farm household＇s welfare. Under the conditions of the supplier-induced demand, the excessive treatments caused by suppliers＇ moral hazard must bring about drastic increase for medical expenses, and moreover, eventually lead to serious waste and low efficiency of medical resources allocation. This paper theoretically analyzes the welfare effects of New Cooperative Medical System from the perspective of supplier-induced demand, and concludes that reforming orientation for NCMS should be directed to control the medical supplier＇s moral hazard so that really to improve farmer＇s welfare from the NCMS.

关 键 词：新农合 供给者诱导需求 福利效果 信息不对称 支付制度 可持续发展 

分 类 号：F323.89[经济管理—产业经济]