自由现金流、债务契约与企业投资效率——基于中国房地产上市企业的实证分析  

Free Cash Flow,Debt covenants and Corporate Investment Efficiency——An Empirical Research of Listed Real Companies in China

作　　者：熊婷[1] 程博[1] 王菁[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江农林大学经济管理系,浙江临安310013 [2]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《贵州财经大学学报》2013年第6期59-70,共12页Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"我国非营利组织信息批露及其治理机制研究"(批准号:12CGL121);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"企业家能力和行为偏差对企业投资决策影响机理研究"(批准号:11YJC630031);浙江省自然科学基金"基于企业家能力视角的企业投资行为研究"(批准号:Y6110042)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：以2006—2011年中国房地产上市企业为研究对象,借鉴Richardson投资模型,实证检验自由现金流、债务契约对企业投资效率的影响,以及债务契约对自由现金流与企业投资效率的调节效应。同时,还考察了危机冲击下自由现金流、债务契约对企业投资效率的影响,以及债务契约的调节作用。研究发现:(1)房地产企业对债务融资的依赖性较强,企业前期的现金持有量与企业当期资本量显著正相关。(2)房地产企业自由现金流与企业投资效率显著正相关,自由现金流水平越高,企业投资效率越低,过度投资越严重。(3)负债融资对企业具有相机治理的功效,债务契约可以减少自由现金流的滥用,对房地产企业过度投资有一定的抑制作用,企业长期负债的治理效应尤为突出。(4)债务融资对自由现金流与企业投资效率起调节作用,在控制危机冲击外部宏观环境的变化后这种调节效用仍然存在,长期负债对自由现金流与过度投资的调节作用更为明显。研究结果表明,对中国房地产上市企业而言,债务契约在企业治理中发挥着重要的"监督效应"和"自由现金流效应",负债对企业投资非效率行为具有相机治理作用,可以在一定程度上抑制企业非效率投资,从而纾解股东与债权人之间的委托代理冲突。This paper using China real estate listed companies from 2005 to 2011, we adopts Richardson investment model to test the free cash flow, debt covenants on corporate investment efficiency, as well as the moderating effects of debt covenants to free cash flow and corporate investment efficiency. We also test the effects of free cash flow, debt covenants on the efficiency of investment, as well as the moderating effect of debt covenants under the crisis. The corporate of real estate have a strong dependence on debt financing, the previous cash holdings has a significant positive effect on current capital amount. Free cash flow has a significant positive effect on investment efficiency. Debt financing has camera governance on companies. Debt covenants can reduce the misuse of free cash flow, a certain inhibitory effect on over - investment in real estate companies, especially the effectiveness of long - term liabilities. Debt financing have a moderate effect on free cash flow and investment efficiency, the effect still exists when control the variable of crisis, the moderate effect of the long - term liabilities on free cash flow and over - investment more obviously. The results show that debt covenants plays an important ＂supervision effect＂ and ＂free cash flow effect＂ on corporate governance, the liabilities have camera governance on inefficient investment behavior, inhibit inefficient investments, and thus relieve the principal -agent conflict between the solution of the shareholders and creditors in the listed companies of real estate.

关 键 词：自由现金流 债务契约 过度投资 危机冲击 房地产上市企业 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]