地方政府应对金融危机的外部冲击更依赖财政手段吗?——基于省级面板数据的经验分析  被引量:5

Local Government Response to the Financial Crisis More Dependent on Financial Means ?——Based on the Provincial Panel Data Analysis

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作  者:段军山[1] 宋贺[2] 

机构地区:[1]广东财经大学金融学院,广东广州510320 [2]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出  处:《产业经济研究》2013年第6期56-65,共10页Industrial Economics Research

基  金:国家社科基金青年项目"资产价格波动对金融体系稳定影响研究"(项目编号:10CJL017)的资助

摘  要:为什么地方政府应对金融危机更依赖财政投入?在官员晋升压力和追求GDP的目标效应函数框架逻辑上,探讨省级政府在应对危机时候的财政行为与商业银行信贷行为谁更有利。在地方政府拥有独立目标下的财政金融掌控能力的发挥需要条件,这种条件又与地方官员的晋升动力与机制紧密联系:地方政府对财政税收的掌控能力较强,与他们对金融掌控能力的特征明显不同。实证结果表明,当地方政府面临金融危机等外部冲击时,更多依赖财政手段,财政支出明显高于银行信贷增长;东中西部面临金融危机冲击时,地方财政行为和银行信贷行为存在显著差别;西部地区对财政的依赖更强,而中部地区信贷减少更为明显。Why local government response to the financial crisis more dependent on financial investment? This article use logic framework about officials promotion pressure and the pursuit of GDP target effect function to explore that the provincial government in response to the financial crisis, the credit behavior of commercial banks or financial investment are more favora- ble. The local government has an independent fiscal and financial objective which control the conditions needed to play, this condition also linked with power and promotion of local officials mechanisms :local government has more tax revenue control a- bility, and the ability to control their financial characteristic is significantly different. The empirical results show that when lo- cal governments face financial crisis and other external shocks, greater reliance on fiscal measures,fiscal expenditure was sig- nificantly higher than the growth of bank credit; East Midwest facing financial crisis, the local fiscal behavior and the behavior of bank credit show significant differences;western region of fiscal dependence is stronger, while the credit of central region re- duce even more apparent.

关 键 词:地方政府 金融危机 外部冲击 经济增长 锦标赛模式 

分 类 号:F810.7[经济管理—财政学]

 

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