动态不一致性对最优长期契约的影响  

Impact of Dynamic Inconsistency on Optimal Long-Term Contracts

作　　者：陆阳[1] 庄新田[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110819

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第11期1665-1668,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N120306001)

摘　　要：针对长期契约中的重复道德风险问题,在考虑了代理人时间偏好的基础上建立三阶段的激励模型,探索动态不一致性对长期契约的影响.结果表明:动态不一致性不改变长期契约的记忆性,即代理人当前的高产出将对后续阶段其自身报酬产生积极的影响;动态不一致性改变了长期契约各阶段之间的鞅性质,第一阶段的最优效用小于第二、第三阶段效用的期望值.With the repeated moral hazard of long-term contracts aimed at and the agent of time preference taken into account, a three-period incentive model was developed and the impact of dynamic inconsistency on long-term contracts was then explored. The results showed that dynamic inconsistency does not change the memorability of long-term contracts, i. e. the high output at the current stage will positively affect the agent＇s payoff in the later periods; dynamic inconsistency does change the martingales of different periods, and the agent~ optimal utility in Period 1 is less than the expected value in Period 2 and Period 3.

关 键 词：动态不一致性 长期契约 重复道德风险 委托代理问题 鞅 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]