政府财政支持对企业R&D投入的激励问题研究——基于委托代理框架的博弈分析  

A Study on the Incentive Issue of Governmental Fiscal Subsidy to Enterprises' R&D Investment——A Game Analysis Based on Principal-agent Framework

作　　者：李祥龙[1] 陈少晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学经济学院,福建福州350117

出　　处：《山东财政学院学报》2013年第6期49-54,60,共7页Journal of Shandong Finance Institute

基　　金：福建省科技计划项目"闽台企业科技投入的财政支持机制与政策比较研究"(2012R01020056)

摘　　要：委托代理关系下的信息不对称使得政府面临着企业R&D投入的博弈难题。基于对博弈动机的分析,政府财政支持与企业R&D投入的博弈过程可分为事前不完全信息博弈和事后不完美信息博弈两个阶段,其中事前博弈是通过建立收益矩阵来讨论双方的策略选择,事后博弈是政府在约束条件下设计契约合同来激励企业遵守承诺,刺激R&D支出。分析表明,当创新型企业的信号成本较低,或者原始创新与二次创新的R&D补贴率差别明显时,企业具有较大的积极性进行逆向选择,而且,政府对创新型企业的税率优惠幅度随着企业的努力成本增大而降低。因此,政府需要通过加强人力资本的投资力度、建立健全监督问责机制、完善政府与创新型企业的契约合同、完善知识产权保护法等措施来降低博弈成本,提高R&D的投入产出率。The asymmetric information brings about a dilemma for the government as regards enterprises＇ R＆D Investment in the principal-agent relationship. Based on the analysis on game motivation, the game process consists of two stages ： game of incomplete information in advance and game of imperfect information afterwards. The game in advance involves both sides choosing the proper strategies by establishing a benefit matrix. The game afterwards in- volves the government designing contract under the constraint condition to stimulate the enterprises to keep their promises on R＆D investment. The game analysis shows that the enterprises have a greater power to make adverse se- lection when the signaling cost of innovative enterprises is low, or the difference of rate of subsidization between orig- inal innovation and secondary innovation is obvious. In addition, the preferential tax rate for innovative enterprises decreases with the increasing effort costs. Therefore, the government should take actions, such as strengthening the investment on human capital, establishing and perfecting the supervision and accountability, perfecting the contracts and intellectual property protection act, to reduce the game costs and improve the output-input ratio of R＆D.

关 键 词：政府财政支持 企业R&D投入 博弈 

分 类 号：F810.45[经济管理—财政学]