规制政策选择的政治博弈、内生因素与外在影响  

Political Game,Endogenous Factors and External Influences in Regulation Policy Choices

作　　者：黄润泽[1] 孙翊锋[1] 王红梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学公共事务学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《福建行政学院学报》2013年第5期9-14,40,共7页Journal of Fujian Administration Institute

基　　金：厦门大学985工程"公共管理重点学科建设"项目;教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-09-0672)

摘　　要：规制政策选择不只是一个技术问题或计算问题,因为政策选择过程是一个政治过程。作为平衡利益冲突的产物,规制政策是政治博弈均衡的结果。在政治博弈中,政治制度框架、利益相关者行为、规制政策制定程序、意识形态和突发事件等会影响规制政策选择。立法机构、司法机构、利益集团、企业和公民等之间的相互博弈,在有助于规制政策合理化的同时,也会决定规制的权利分配,改变规制的成本收益,影响规制的强度和导致规制效率损失。Regulation policy choice is not merely a technical question because policy choice is a politi- cal process. As a product of balancing interest conflicts, regulation policy is the result of political game equilibrium. In politics, framework of political system, stakeholder＇s behavior, regulation policy-mak- ing process, ideology and unexpected events affect regulation policy choices. Interactions among legisla- tive and judicial institutions, interest groups, enterprises and citizens, etc. , help to rationalize regula- tion. At the same time, these interactions also decide on right allocation and change costs and benefits, which affects the strength of regulation and leads to loss in regulation efficiency.

关 键 词：规制政策选择 政治博弈 内生因素 外在影响 

分 类 号：D035-01[政治法律—政治学]