农业面源污染控制中的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Agricultual Non-point Source Pollution Control

作　　者：刘伟[1] 周娟[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学经济学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《菏泽学院学报》2013年第5期23-29,共7页Journal of Heze University

摘　　要：当前农业面源污染已成为我国水体污染的主要根源和空气污染的重要来源,而化肥、农药等农资品污染是农业面源污染重中之重.运用博弈论的理论和方法构建农业面源污染控制中政府、农资经销商和农户博弈模型,分析其纯策略纳什均衡并求出混合策略纳什均衡解.研究表明,政府通过设置合适的对农资经销商补贴、对农户补贴以及农资经销商违规销售农资的罚金,可以提高农资经销商和农户参与控制农业面源污染的积极性和可能性,从而有效控制农业面源污染.The agricultural non- point source pollution has become an important source of the main source of water pollution and air pollution in China. Fertilizers, pesticides and other agricultural products pollution in agricul- tural non - point source pollution is the priority among priorities. Using the theory and method of game theory to con- struct the game model of government, agricultural materials dealers and famers which in the control of agricultural non- point source pollution, and we analyze its pure strategy Nash Equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash Equilibri- um. The research shows that the government by setting the appropriate subsidies for agricultural supplies distribu- tor, subsidies for farmers and the agricultural materials fine from illegal sales of agricultural materials dealers , which can impove the enthusiasm and possibilities of farmers and agricultural materials dealers to participate in the control of agricultural non - point source pollution, thus to control the agricultural non - point source pollution effec- tivly.

关 键 词：农业面源污染 污染控制 政府 农户 农资经销商 博弈 

分 类 号：F323.22[经济管理—产业经济]