产品质量保险作用下的质量控制策略分析  

Quality Control Strategies under Product Quality Insurance

作　　者：孙树垒[1] 吴士亮[1] 孟秀丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学,南京210046

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2013年第11期39-44,共6页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(项目编号:11YJC630225);江苏省软科学项目(项目编号:BR2008041)

摘　　要：产品质量直接影响消费者权益,各国皆以立法形式规定生产企业对质量缺陷承担责任,对消费者权益加以保护。生产企业可以通过统计质量控制提高产品质量水平,可以借助产品质量保险,化解质量风险。本文为揭示产品质量保险费率厘定与生产企业质量控制策略相关时,产品质量保险对质量控制策略的影响规律,建立了一个理论模型,分析了质量控制策略的抽检特性曲线,研究了生产企业存在风险规避和需求函数下的最优质量控制策略,发现产品质量保险对生产企业质量控制具有积极促进作用。Product quality has a direct influence on consumer fights and interests. In order to protect consumers, many governments have introduced strict legislation on product quality to oblige manufacturer to be responsible for defective product. Manufacturem can then either establish a strict system of statistical quality control, or try to have their liability covered by insurance. To reveal the rule of influ- ence of product quality insurance on quality control strategies when insurer＇s insurance premium is closely related to manufacturer＇s quality control strategies, a theorefieal model is proposed. Operating characteristic curve for quality control strategies is analyzed, and optimal quality control strategies are studied under manufacturer＇s risk aversion attitude and demand function through the model. It is shown that product quality insurance has positive role in promoting manufacturer＇s quality control.

关 键 词：产品质量保险 质量控制 保险费率 抽检特性曲线 

分 类 号：F840.69[经济管理—保险]