机构投资者:选择治理还是介入治理——基于薪酬—绩效敏感度的内生性研究  

Governance-selection or Governance-intervention Institutional Investors' Role in Corporate Governance——Endogenous Study on Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity

作　　者：刘涛[1] 毛道维[2] 宋海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064 [2]四川大学公司金融研究所,四川成都610064

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2013年第11期95-105,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"中国信用制度体系建设及其次序研究"(09AZD046)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以2010～2011年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据作为研究样本，以内生性影响为视角，分别采用普通最小二乘法（OLS）和二阶段最小二乘法（TSLS）实证研究了机构投资者持股比例与公司管理层薪酬一绩效敏感度之间的相互影响关系。研究发现，当不考虑内生性影响时，部分机构的持股比例与管理层薪酬一绩效敏感度是互为因果的双向关系；当考虑内生性影响之后。管理层薪酬一绩效敏感度显著影响了机构持股比例，反向的因果关系变得不再显著。这样的研究结果有别于现有的许多研究结论，表明我国机构投资者现实中扮演的是“选择治理”的消极治理角色，而并非“介入治理”的积极治理角色，需要政府有关部门进行相应的制度设计，以进一步提高机构投资者的投资理性。Concerning the influence of endogenous problem, this paper tested the reciprocal causation between institutional in- vestors＇ shareholding stake and corporate management pay-for-performance sensitivity by employing both OLS and TSLS, with the datum of companies listed at both the Shanghai A stock market and Shenzhen A stock market as the study sample. The research finds that, when the endogenous influence was not considered, the relation between pay-for-performance sensitivity and some kind of institutional in- vestors＇ shareholding stake is a two-way causality. But when the endogenous influence was regarded, the two-way causality became one- way which was that the pay-for-performance sensitivity significantly influenced some kind of institutional investors＇ shareholding stake while the reversed relation did not pass the test. The empirical results infer that Chinese institutional investors play a role of ＂corporate governance-selection＂ instead of ＂corporate governance-intervention＂ in reality, which is different from conclusions of many existing re- searches. The corresponding policy is needed to further promote the extent of investing rationality of Chinese institutional investors.

关 键 词：选择治理 介入治理 薪酬一绩效敏感度 内生性问题 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] F276.6