集体土地流转中相关主体行为的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of the Subjects' Behaviors in Collective Land Transfer

作　　者：邱雪萍[1] 陈洪昭[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学经济学院,福建福州350007

出　　处：《沈阳农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期390-393,共4页Journal of Shenyang Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：福建省科技厅软科学项目(2012R0035)

摘　　要：集体土地流转涉及的利益主体为农户、地方政府及企业。从各主体的利益行为动机出发,建立并分析农户与地方政府、企业与农户之间的动态博弈。结果表明:集体土地流转市场中的政府行为并不规范,地方政府具有主动权,处于优势地位,往往借公共利益的目的征用农户土地,给予农户较低的补偿费;企业作为经济主体,参与集体土地的流转,与农户之间的博弈在于以牺牲农户的切身利益来实现企业利益的最大化;农户在与地方政府、企业之间的博弈中总是处于被动和不利地位,其在博弈中做出的决策对于维护自身利益的作用微小。为推进集体土地持续有序流转,需规范相关参与主体的行为,降低其投机热情;完善集体土地流转市场建设,保障交易公平与效率;完善农户利益表达机制,维护农户切身利益。Famers, local governments and enterprises are interest subjects in the collective land transfer. The dynamic game between local governments, enterprises and farmers is built and analyzed from the perspective of each subject＇s interest and behavioral motive. The results show： Local governments behave irregularly, who expropriate land with initiative and dominant position on the purpose of public interest and give farmers a low compensate fee; enterprises, who participate in the collective land transfer as economic subject, try to maximize their own interest at the expense of the farmers＇ interest in the game; and farmers, who are in a passive and disadvantaged position in the game, play a tiny role in protecting their own interest. To promote the collective land transfer orderly, it is necessary to standardize the behavior of each participating subject, reduce their speculative fervor and improve the market construction of the collective land transfer to ensure the fair and efficient trade and expression mechanism of farmers＇ interests and protect farmers＇ vital interests.

关 键 词：集体土地 土地流转 地方政府 企业 农户 行为动机 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济] F301.24