嵌入期权的激励相容型软件外包付款合同设计  

Incentive-compatible payment contracting for software offshoring embedded with trigger-option

作　　者：石晓军[1] 张顺明[1] Hiroshi TSUJI 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院中国财政金融政策研究中心,北京100872 [2]日本大阪府立大学系统科学学院,大阪5990581

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2013年第11期2822-2830,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70972001);国家杰出青年科学基金(70825003)

摘　　要：扩展了文献[1]的经典模型,建立起激励相容框架下软件外包付款合同设计的正式模型.特别之处在于嵌入了一个"中期检查"的触发期权,在模型中采用示性函数的方法简洁表示.通过基准模型与嵌入触发期权的模型结果的比较,证明了嵌入触发期权对外包的风险控制、促进承接商(vendor)提高努力程度均占有优势.还发现嵌入期权对客户(client)与承接商的双重约束功能,主要通过改变超支分担系数来约束客户行为.利用中国对日本的软件外包承接商的调查研究数据,证实了嵌入触发期权主要通过促进承接商超支控制效率的提高而实现外包风险有效控制,也证实了双重约束功能及其他主要理论结果.This paper extends Banerjee and Duflo＇s software offshoring model to an incentive-compatible framework and use it to restructure payment contracting in order to control offshoring risk more effectively. We propose a two-stage payments contrm^ting with an embedded milestone-inspection trigger option. The vendor can only get the second-stage payment given her first-stage work satisfies certain criteria set by the client at the inspection point. We model such trigger option using an indicator function method and show that the embedded trigger option improves offshoring-risk mitigation and makes the vendor work harder. Furthermore, embedded trigger option imposes constraints on and thus improve on the client＇s behavior by changing the share ratio of the overrun for the client. Empirical evidence from the survey data of the China＇s vendors for the Japanese clients strongly supports main results of our model. Particularly, evidence supports that trigger option helps risk mitigation mainly by improving vendor＇s overrun reduction efficiency and is a bilateral incentive mechanism for both the client and the vendor.

关 键 词：软件外包 付款合同设计 激励相容 触发期权 

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