多供应商的OEM供应链在供应与需求随机条件下的协调决策  

Coordination in an OEM Supply Chain with Random Supply and Demand

作　　者：陈志明[1] 陈志祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2013年第12期1839-1846,共8页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972079)

摘　　要：OEM供应链可能因为供需两端的随机性而面临经济损失的风险,随机需求源于品牌企业无法准确预测产品销量,随机供应来自OEM供应商的产能约束等原因。针对上述随机的特点,建立了分散决策下的多个OEM供应商和单个品牌企业的Stackelberg博弈模型,求解出均衡生产订货批量。分析了集中决策下OEM供应链的利润最大化条件,以此为优化目标,引入结合收益分享的额外收购契约。品牌企业通过收购OEM供应商的富余产品和分享外包产品的销售收入,可以有效提高各方收益,实现OEM供应链的协调。An OEM supply chain may suffer a loss due to the random supply coming from the in- sufficient capacity of suppliers and the random demand resulting from the difficulty to accurately fore- cast the sales. In order to make the optimal ordering and producing decisions in such condition, we model Stackelberg game between multiple suppliers and one original equipment manufacturer. Then, using the centralized setting as a bench mark, we propose a contract, which combines revenue sharing and surplus purchase, to achieve coordination in OEM supply chain. Through adjusting the contract＇s parameters, the decentralized pro{it can be improved to the centralized maximum profit.

关 键 词：OEM 博弈 供应链协调 随机供应 随机需求 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]