产权改革、竞争环境与政策工具:观照国企改革理论  

Reform of Property Right, Competition Environment and Policy Instrument: the Reflection of Theory of State-Owned Corporate Reform

作　　者：戴锦[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连交通大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连116052

出　　处：《改革》2013年第11期123-130,共8页Reform

摘　　要：产权改革论和竞争环境论是迄今为止最有影响力的两种国有企业改革理论,这两种理论分别从内部产权激励和外部竞争激励角度提出一系列旨在提高国有企业经济效率的理论观点和政策建议。进入到国有经济布局和结构的战略性调整阶段,一种新的国有企业理论——"政策工具论"正在逐步形成。该理论的基本观点是国有企业是政府的一种公共政策工具。从这一视角出发,政策工具论不仅能够解释国有企业的最优化(国企改革)问题,也能够解释国有企业的存在性问题,因此是一种比较完整的国有企业理论。The theory of property rights reform and the theory of competition environment are so far two most influential theories of state owned enterprises （SOEs） reform. In the view of inner property incentive and external competition incentive respectively, the two theories have presented a series of theoretical perspectives and policy proposals on how to improve SOEs economic efficiency. During the ,period of strategic adjustments in the distribution and structure of the sta^e-owned sector, a new theory of SOEs --＂policy instrument theory＂ has been formed gradually, the basic idea of which is that SOEs are one kind of government policy instruments. From this point of view, the theory can explain not only the optimization of SOEs （SOEs reform）, but also the existence of SOEs. Therefore, it is a relatively complete theory of SOEs.

关 键 词：国有企业产权改革 国有企业竞争环境改革 国有经济主体地位 

分 类 号：F822.0[经济管理—财政学]